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THE CLASS ACTION AND TITLE VII-AN OVERVIEW
The class action device' and Title VII2 enforcement go hand in hand. In
a proper case, a suit alleging a violation of Title VII is by nature a class
action since it attempts to remedy the effects of employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of a class characteristic. 3 As in any other case, however,
a class action is permitted only if the requirements of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met.' Before certifying an action as a
class action' the court must determine that (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of its members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) common
questions of law or fact exist as to the class (commonality); (3) the claims
of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class (typical-
ity); and (4) the representative parties will adequately protect the interest
of the class (representativity).
Further, in order to maintain the action as a class action the court must
determine that (1) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class so that final injunctive or
declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the whole class,7 or (2) that
questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
thereby superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient han-
dling of the case.8 In addition to the prerequisites of Rule 23, certain juris-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1974).
3. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970); Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
4. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
5. The court must determine by order whether an action brought as a class action may be
so maintained as soon as practicable after the commencement of the action. However, such
an order may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the
merits. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1). The named plaintiff, by way of motion, asks the court that
his action be maintained as a class action. The determination may be made on the basis of
the pleadings, but generally should be made on the basis of more information than the
pleadings afford. See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973). Discovery and
a preliminary evidentiary hearing may be appropriate and are authorized with respect to the
issues of maintainability. Id. However, this point in the trial is an improper time to decide
the merits of the action, although inevitably there will exist some overlap. Id. at 714. See also
Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
7. Id. 23(b)(2).
8. Id. 23(b)(3).
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dictional prerequisites mandated by Title VII exist which apply in the
class action context and affect either the class representative's capacity to
maintain the suit in his own right or the definition and scope of the class
as a whole.'
Commentators agree that the courts are quite liberal in applying the
Rule 23 strictures on class actions.10 This liberality is primarily a function
of the remedial nature of Title VII and the undeniable fact that employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic is by definition
suited to class action treatment." It is recognized that the class action
device, with its binding res judicata effect on all class members is an
efficient and powerful mechanism for redress of grievances when properly
utilized and not abused.' 2 On the other hand, because a court's judgment
is binding on the class, win or lose, it has been argued that the Rule 23
mandates require strict compliance for the protection of unnamed class
members. 3 The courts are becoming increasingly aware of the class ac-
tion's susceptibility to abuse and are keenly aware that the cost of proceed-
ing by way of class action, not only financially but in respect of valuable
court time, requires that Rule 23 be satisfied in all cases. 4
This article proposes to examine the prerequisites to bringing and main-
taining a Title VII class action-those legislatively imposed'5 and those
mandated by Rule 23.16 In addition, the administration of the Title VII
class action will be examined, with a particular emphasis on the court's
9. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (1974). See also text accompanying footnotes 17-22 infra.
10. See generally 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.10-1 (2d ed. 1974); 7 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1771, at 662-63 (1972); Comment, Class
Actions and Title WI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Proper Class Representative and
the Class Remedy, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1005, 1006-11 (1973).
11. See cases cited note 3 supra.
12. The court's judgment in an action for injunctive relief is binding on the class as a whole,
whether favorable or unfavorable. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(3); 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
T 23.10-1, at 23-2769 (2d ed. 1974). In a suit claiming individual damages for class members,where class action treatment is appropriate, the court's judgment is binding only on those
who fail to "opt out" of the class. FED. R. Cw. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2). See also text accompanying
notes 56-62 infra.
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125-27 (5th Cir.
1969) (Godbold, J., concurring).
14. See, e.g., Borovac v. Meat Cutters Union, 8 E.P.D. 9648, at 5747 (D. Neb. 1973)
(burden on plaintiff to establish right to class action since procedural consequences of class
action time consuming and complex); Dennis v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 5 E.P.D. 8599,
at 7756 (D.S.C. 1973) (unfair to defendant/companies to turn every employer/employee dis-
pute into a Title VII class action); Tolbert v. Western Elec. Co., 56 F.R.D. 108, 114 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (class actions susceptible to abuse).
15. See note 9 supra.
16. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
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categorization of a Title VII suit for injunctive relief and back pay under
Rule 23(b), and its consequences.
I. FILING WITH THE EEOC-JUMSDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE
A party who seeks relief under Title VII from certain employment prac-
tices must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) before the institution of a court action, in order that the
EEOC might attempt to conciliate the dispute, and, if unsuccessful, bring
a civil action in its own right.17 Only when conciliation efforts have been
unsuccessful and the EEOC has failed to bring a civil action, or upon a
dismissal of the charging party's claim by the EEOC, is the aggrieved
person authorized to bring a civil action under Title VII.1
In the class action context this legislative requirement affects not only
class definition but the maintenance of the action itself.0 It has been
generally held that participation in a Title VII class action is not restricted
to those who filed charges with the EEOC.0 Consequently, a named plain-
tiff who has filed may represent a class of individuals who have not filed
and would otherwise not be allowed to maintain the suit. The failure of
the class representative to file an EEOC charge is grounds for dismissal of
the class action since the court would have no jurisdiction over that indi-
vidual." In addition, if at the time of the class representative's filing of
charges with the EEOC there were members of the class who would have
been precluded from similar filing with the EEOC due to the running of
the time limit within which to file, the court will limit the scope of the class
to exclude them and include only those who could have filed.22
II. SCOPE OF THE CLASS AND RULE 23(a)
The remedial policy behind Title VII and the adaptability of the class
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (f)(1) (1974).
18. Id.
19. A class representative's failure to file calls for dismissal of the action. See note 21 infra.
Failure of class members to file within the time prescribed may operate to exclude them from
membership and so limit the class that the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is not
met. See cases cited note 22 infra.
20. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. See Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 8 E.P.D. 9625, at 5668 (D.S.C.
1972).
22. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 1975); Ruhe v. Philadel-
phia Inquirer, 9 E.P.D. 9984, at 7105 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also Mather v. Western Airlines,
Inc., 59 F.R.D. 535, 536 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (distinguishing cases cited note 20 supra on the basis
that in those cases the court dealt with non-filing class members alleging continuing viola-
tions of Title VI0.
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action device to discrimination suits have accounted for the courts' general
endorsement of a broad definition of the class on behalf of which a class
representative may sue. The landmark decision of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. validated what
has come to be called the "across the board" class action. 24 An aggrieved
employee may maintain a class action for relief against general employ-
ment discrimination although he may have been affected by only one
aspect of an employer's discriminatory policy. Thus, a discharged em-
ployee may sue not only on behalf of those unjustly discharged, but on
behalf of those presently employed and those who may be employed in the
future.25 Likewise, an applicant refused employment may represent those
currently employed and subjected to the employer's discriminatory pol-
icy.26
The "across the board" approach and its underpinnings in Title VII
policy have accounted in many cases for a relaxed application of the Rule
23(a) prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality and representa-
tivity.2 It is generally felt, however, that a mere allegation of "across the
23. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
24. This broad class definition is circumscribed only by the insistence of the courts that a
definable class exist by reference to which an individual's membership may be tested. See
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d
825 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1760, at 581 (1972). The class need not be so ascertainable that every potential member
can be identified at the beginning of the action. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491
(E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Ruhe v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 9 E.P.D. T 9984, at 7106 (E.D. Pa.
1975). A class representative's failure to adequately define the class is normally not grounds
for dismissal of the action, rather the court has broad discretion in limiting the scope of the
class where the need arises. See Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 8 E.P.D. 9798, at 6337
(N.D. Ga. 1974); Hardy v. United States Steel Corp., 289 F. Supp. 200, 203 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 'AND PROCEDURE § 1760, at 582
(1972). But see Kinsey'v. Legg, Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91, 100 (D.D.C. 1973) (class action
dismissed); Allen v. Pipefitters Local No. 208, 56 F.R.D. 473, 476 (D. Colo. 1972) (class action
dismissed). The question of class definition often arises in, connection with the numerosity
requirement discussed at Section II.A. infra.
25. See, e.g., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1969).
26. See, e.g., Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57, 64-65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 951 (1970).
27. In some cases the courts have expressly chosen Title VII cases for relaxed treatment
under Rule 23(a). See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1975)
("across the board" attack consonant with broad remedial purposes of Title VII); Rodriguez
v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974) (when class relief sought in
complaint the court should liberally apply the requirements of Rule 23(a)); Moss v. Lane Co.,
50 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. Va. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973).
Other cases have summarily certified the action as a class action with little or no analysis of
the Rule 23(a) prerequisites in cases of alleged "across the board" discrimination. See, e.g.,
[Vol. 10:325
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board" discriminatory employment policy is not enough to warrant class
action certification, but that each case must be put to the test of satisfying
each prerequisite of Rule 23(a).3
A. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) specifies that a class action may be instituted only if the
membership of the class which the named plaintiff seeks to represent is so
numerous that joinder of its individual members is impracticable. In the
standard "across the board" discrimination suit the numerosity require-
ment is often deemed satisfied pro forma. 9 However, it is held that the
burden is on the named plaintiff to prove that Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied."0
Bormann v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(allegation that defendants discriminate against all past, present and future women appli-
cants, consequently the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied); McBroom v. Western Elec.
Co., 7 E.P.D. 9347, at 7574 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Batiste v. Furmco Const. Co., 350 F. Supp.
10, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974) (Title VII action
is necessarily a class action so prerequisites were satisfied). Further, in the usual case of a
Title VII action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, some commentators are at a loss to
fathom why defendants would challenge the class device since the concepts of res judicata
and stare decisis would insulate a successful defendant in an individual action, and the class
device itself would protect an unsuccessful defendant from subsequent harassing litigation.
See 7 C. WRmHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1771, at 664 (1972). See
also Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir. 1975); Paddison v. Fidelity
Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Williams v. Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 19, 59
F.R.D. 49, 54 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
28. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); Mason v.
Calgon Corp., 63 F.R.D. 98, 102-03 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Borovac v. Meat Cutters Union, 8 E.P.D.
9648, at 5747 (D. Neb. 1973); Moore v. Louisville Downs, Inc., 7 E.P.D. 9151, at 6814
(W.D. Ky. 1973); Dennis v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 5 E.P.D. 8599, at 7756 (D.S.C. 1973).
29. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1975); Rodriguez
v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974); Crockett v. Virginia Folding
Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312, 317 (E.D. Va. 1974); Bormann v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing
Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Batiste v. Furnco Const. Co., 350 F. Supp. 10,
13 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974).
30. See, e.g., Williams v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 19, 59 F.R.D. 49, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Tolbert v. Western Elec. Co., 56 F.R.D. 108, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
The plaintiff need not show with specificity the exact number and identity of class mem-
bers. Obviously, in an "across the board" class action it would be impossible to identify those
class members not yet in existence. See, e.g., Ruhe v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 9 E.P.D. 9984,
at 7106 (E.D. Pa. 1975). However, the plaintiff will be required to make some showing that
his is more than an individual claim, or that more than a few individuals have been affected.
See, e.g., O'Brien v. Shimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (court was unable to
find more than eleven individuals who may have been affected by alleged discrimination and
held joinder of individuals not impracticable). See also Dennis v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.,
5 E.P.D. 8599, at 7755 (D.S.C. 1973) (named plaintiff unable to show more than three
others similarly situated); Calhoun v. Riverside Research Institute, 4 E.P.D. 7825, at 6123
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (named plaintiff attempted to represent a putative class of blacks denied
1976] 329
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The plaintiff's evidence may reveal only an individual grievance or one
affecting only a few individuals with no showing of a policy to discriminate
generally, in which case the numerosity requirement would fail.', In such
cases it is held that the test of impracticability of joinder is not a quantita-
tive measurement but one that requires the court to consider, in addition
to numbers, the geographical area of the group, the manageability of the
parties, and the nature of the action and relation of the parties to others
in the class.2
B. Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that common questions of law or fact exist with
reference to the class as a whole before a class representative may institute
a class action. The commonality requirement provides no real obstacle to
the named plaintiff in Title VII class actions. Common questions of law
or fact are deemed to exist insofar as the suit seeks to remedy discrimina-
tory employment policy. 3 This is so notwithstanding that the effect of past
or present discrimination might differ as to individuals.3 1
C. Typicality
The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a) (3) states that the claims of the
promotion but court held numerosity requirement not met where it found only three to five
blacks eligible for promotion).
31. Where the numerosity requirement is not met the court will normally offer as justifica-
tion the fact that plaintiff's averments alleged only individual acts and not a pattern or
practice of discrimination. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Wometco Blue Circle, Inc., 59 F.R.D.
308, 309 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). Cf. Walker v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 8 E.P.D. 1 9693, at 5898
(E.D. Mich. 1974). In most cases, however, there appears to the court a concrete and numer-
ous class of individuals presently or prospectively discriminated against. In these cases there
is no vagueness or doubt about the numerosity or existence of the class, and the discrimina-
tion alleged is broad and far-reaching and cannot be construed as an isolated incident. But
where the putative class is only speculative, the class action will be dismissed. See Tolbert
v. Western Elec. Co., 56 F.R.D. 108, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Cf. Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969).
32. See Wilburn v. Steamship Trade Ass'n, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (D. Md. 1974);
Tuma v. American Can Co., 367 F. Supp. 1178, 1189 (D.N.J. 1973); Moore v. Louisville
Downs, Inc., 7 E.P.D. 9151, at 6814-15 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
33. See Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974); Carr v.
Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57, 62 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499
(5th Cir. 1968); Hall v. Werthan Bag Co., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). See
generally 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.10-1, at 23-2765-67 (2d ed. 1974).
34. See cases cited note 33 supra. To satisfy both the commonality and typicality require-
ments a court will look for some nexus between the named plaintiff and the class he seeks to
represent. See, e.g., Wells v. Ramsay, Scarlette & Co., 506 F.2d 436, 437 (5th Cir. 1975)
(named plaintiff not a longshoreman so no nexus exists between him and the putative class
of longshoremen).
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representative parties must be typical of the claims of the class. Some
courts have treated the requirement as synonomous with commonality35 or
representativity 0 Other courts have adopted a common-sense approach
and have required that the only showing which need be made is that there
are other class members who have the same or similar grievances, even
hypothetically." In any event, as in the case of the commonality require-
ment, the typicality requirement is relaxed in Title VII cases since a chal-
lenge to an employer's policy will, in most cases, reflect common griev-
ances.8
D. Representativity
The court must be assured that the class representative will adequately
protect the interests of the class.39 The representative capacity of the
named plaintiff is the most frequently questioned of the Rule 23(a) prere-
quisites. It is also the only one of the four upon which even the most liberal
of courts will reflect with other than summary treatment since the repre-
sentative party's position as a "private attorney general"4 requires that he
represent all of the diverse aspects of an "across the board" attack on
employment policy with equanimity.
The representativity requirement is tested on three fronts. First, counsel
for the representative plaintiff must be experienced in civil rights and
employment discrimination work." Secondly, the suit must not appear
35. See generally 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.06-2 at 23-325 (2d ed. 1974). See
also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1968).
36. See, e.g., Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122, 124-26 (W.D. Va. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973).
37. See Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 8 E.P.D. 9626, at 5670 (D.S.C.
1974); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo. 1971).
38. See cases cited note 27 supra. In some cases of alleged "across the board" representa-
tion the difficulties of assessing diverse considerations as between varying groups of employ-
ees will force the court to limit the scope of the class based on a failure to satisfy the typicality
requirement. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91, 99 (D.D.C. 1973) (typical-
ity requirement not met where named plaintiff sought to represent applicants for retail and
institutional securities sales positions and non-sales positions since diverse considerations
existed with respect to qualifications, salaries and duties); Calhoun v. Riverside Research
Institute, 4 E.P.D. 7825 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (typicality requirement not met where professional
employee sought to represent professional and nonprofessional employees due to different
problems faced by two groups).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
40. This term was employed in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968),
to describe the position of the class representative in a Title VII class action.
41. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975); Crockett v.
Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312, 318 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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collusive.4" Thirdly, there must appear no conflicts of interest between the
named plaintiff and other class members.43 This third criterion is the one
most frequently attacked by defendants and consequently results in limi-
tation of class scope or denial of a named plaintiff's representation of the
class. 4 Where a possibility of antagonism exists the court has broad power
to narrow the class or separate it into subclasses without dismissing the
action ."
An aspect of the Rule 23(a) representativity requirement which poses
recurring problems is the so-called "standing" requirement judicially en-
grafted upon Rule 23. When most courts speak of "standing" to represent
the class they are referring to a putative class representative's competency
to represent the class defined by him.46 Most attacks on "standing" have
involved the situation of a former employee suing on behalf of a class of
present and future employees. The objection to his representation of the
class revolves about his lack of knowledge of current employment practices
and the risk that he will pursue an attack only on those policies which had
affected him individually." The objection is also made that he is not a
member of the class he seeks to represent. 8 It is settled that a discharged
42. See cases cited note 41 supra.
43. Id.
44. In American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1974), the court refused
to certify a subclass of current employees in a suit alleging sex bias in the operation of a
retirement trust fund where the class representative (a former employee seeking immediate
distribution from the funds to a subclass of former employees) was potentially in conflict with
that class since an immediate distribution of the funds would diminish the total value of the
trust assets. Similarly, in Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the
court refused to allow a union to represent a class of present and former male employees of
the defendant whose pension plan allegedly discriminated against males where the challenged
provisions resulted from the union's collective bargaining agreement with defendant, the
union might be liable directly to its male members, and the union represented both male and
female employees.
45. See Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 51 (5th Cir. 1974); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). See also FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
Likewise, where appropriate, the court may resort to the implementation of subclasses where
doubt exists as to whether the commonality or typicality requirements have been met. See
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). However, the requirements
of Rule 23 must be met within each subclass as well. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
46. If a putative class representative appears incapable of prosecuting the suit with author-
ity the class action will be dismissed. See, e.g., Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 64 F.R.D. 346,
350 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (named plaintiff's efforts to secure a settlement evidenced his inability
to bear the financial costs of adequate class representation).
47. See Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D. 351, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1974) for an
analysis and rejection of this argument.
48. See, e.g., Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 8 E.P.D. 9700, at 5929 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (dismiss-
ing class action on behalf of those denied or discharged from employment on basis of sex
where named plaintiff was never dismissed and currently employed).
[Vol. 10:325
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employee may sue on behalf of present and future employees since an
opposite holding would tend to induce employers to discharge individuals
suspected as prospective litigants." Likewise, a former employee who vol-
untarily left his job has been held to have standing where he seeks rein-
statement and advancement to the position he would have held were it not
for the discrimination practiced against him." However, a number of cases
involving named plaintiffs long-absented from their former employment
have denied the class action device. 51
A problem which at one point bothered the courts but which now ap-
pears well-settled involved the effect of an unfavorable judgment against
the named plaintiff on his individual claim and his standing to continue
in his representation of the class. There is little doubt now, after the Fourth
Circuit decision in Moss v. Lane Co.,52 that the individual named plain-
tiff's failure on his own claim does not require dismissal of the class claim,
and that, in fact, the class representative may continue in that capacity
notwithstanding his own failure."
A corollary problem is the question of the mootness of the individual
class representative's claim. The general rule holds that the fact an indi-
vidual is no longer subject to discrimination due to an employer's reversal
of policy as to him does not destroy the existence of the controversy be-
tween the employer and the class. A contrary holding would induce an
49. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975); Reed v. Arlington
Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1973); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D.
351, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Morris v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 7 E.P.D. 9405, at 7801 (D.
Conn. 1974).
50. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D. 351, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
51. See Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (D. Del. 1973) (four year
absence); Tolbert v. Daniel Const. Co., 332 F. Supp. 772, 774 (D.S.C. 1971) (three year
absence); Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242, 245 (D. Conn. 1970) (two year
absence); Burney v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86, 90 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (two
year absence). The rationale of these cases rests on the named plaintiff's paucity of knowl-
edge of current employment practices and the questionable personal stake the plaintiff
might have in the existence of current discrimination or discrimination taking place in his
absence. But see Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D. 351, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
52. 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'g inpart, rev'g in part 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970).
53. See Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1380-82 (4th Cir. 1972);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428-29 (8th Cir. 1970); Baxter v. Savan-
nah Sugar Ref. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139, 143 (S.D. Ga. 1972). But the trial court should
normally reassess the class representative's capacity in light of his individual failure. See
Martin v. Thompson Tractor Co., 486 F.2d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 1973). In most cases, since the
unsuccessful class representative has already met the representativity requirement, there is
no reason to believe he will not honestly and aggressively advocate the class position. Moss
v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853, 855-56 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 50 F.R.D. 122
(W.D. Va. 1970).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
employer to "buy off" a prospective litigant and defeat the policy behind
Title VII. 4
II. RULE 23(b) AND BACK PAY
After the Rule 23(a) prerequisites to bringing a class action are satisfied,
the Rule mandates that a class action may be maintained only if one of
the requirements of Rule 23(b) are met.5 5 Rule 23(b)(2) specifies that the
suit may be maintained only where the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class so that final
injunctive or declaratory relief in favor of the class would be appropriate.
Rule 23(b)(3) allows maintainability only where common questions of law
or fact in respect of class members predominates over questions affecting
individuals, thereby offering a superior method of fairly and efficiently
handling the class.
By its terms the Rule 23(b)(2) class action would appear limited to the
situation where purely injunctive and declaratory relief is the object of the
class action. A class action is more properly maintained under Rule
23(b)(3) if individual questions exist, e.g. damages, although common
questions of law and fact predominate. It would appear that individual
damage suits, although maintained within the context of the broader class
action, require that a court maintain the class action under Rule 23(b) (3).
The effect of classifying a class action under either Rule 23(b)(2) or
23(b)(3) is quite important. A Rule 23(b)(3) class action is subject to the
notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2),56 while a Rule 23(b)(2) suit is not. 7
The landmark Supreme Court decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin8
54. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971); Jenkins v. United Gas
Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 31-33 (5th Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian
Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 657-58 (4th Cir. 1967); Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.
Ariz.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 884 (1970). See generally Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class
Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 430 (1973). Cf. Locke v. Board of Public Instruction, 499 F.2d
359, 363-65 (5th Cir. 1974) (suit dismissed where issues moot as to individual and class).
55. Rule 23(b)(1) has no applicability to Title VII class actions but was designed to serve
other purposes. See Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.
at 7765-66 (1970).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) reads as follows:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if
he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
57. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
58. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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has affirmed this procedural requirement 9 and further has mandated that
the named plaintiff must bear the full cost of notice to all members of the
class who are reasonably identifiable."0 This requirement places a very real
burden on a Rule 23(b)(3) class representative and arguably operates ag a
stumbling block to the use of the class action device in such situations."
However, the notice requirement is considered necessary to allow class
members who have individual claims to "opt out" of the class action in
order that they might insulate their claims from the res judicata effects of
an adverse judgment.2
With class-wide back pay awards in Title VII actions now the rule in
most cases, 3 a crucial question to be faced is the proper classification of
the Title VII class action seeking injunctive relief and back pay, and the
proper administration of the action once that classification has been
made.6 For if back pay were analogized to damages in the traditional
59. Id. at 173. The purpose behind the different treatment stems from the very policy which
motivated the federal courts to adopt the class action device. The Rule 23(b)(2) class action
must be, by definition, a cohesive class. Consequently, the drafters of the rule contemplated
that all members of the class would be bound by the court's decision. See Advisory Commit-
tee Notes to Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. at 7767 (1970). No notice was mandated to individual class
members and no opportunity to "opt out" of the class and pursue an individual claim pro-
vided because of the innate cohesiveness of the class. It was felt that any potential unfairness
to class members was outweighed by the policy behind class actions, i.e., eliminating the
possibility of repetitious suits and providing small claimants the means of obtaining redress
for claims too small to warrant individual litigation. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239, 249 (3d Cir. 1975). It was not considered as fair in the 23(b)(3) context to bind all
class members, since 23(b)(3) actions were, by definition, heterogeneous, with individual
interests intervening, particularly since an individual might not want to be included in the
class but would prefer to prosecute his individual claim. Id. at 249. Consequently, the drafters
provided that 23(b)(3) actions should be subject to the requirement that individual notice
and an opportunity to withdraw from the class be given the individual. See Advisory Commit-
tee Notes to Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. at 7767 (1970).
60. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
61. See 7 C. WRGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1754 (Supp. 1974).
Consider the class representative suing for damages on behalf of a nationwide class who must
bear the cost of notice to each individual. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 173-79 (1974) (class representative to bear cost of notice to two million individuals). A
successful plaintiff may, however, recover costs from the defendant if he prevails on the
merits. Polston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 7 E.P.D. 9373, at 7664 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
62. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(B), the text of which is found at note 56 supra.
63. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 256 (5th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-04 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Title
VII authorizes back pay awards in addition to equitable relief. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)
(1974).
64. See generally Barnard, Title VII Class Actions: The Recovery Stage, 16 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 507 (1975); Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems of
Procedure, 8 GA. L. REv. 781 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Edwards].
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sense, then Rule 23(b)(2) treatment would seem precluded since the relief
sought would not be limited to injunctive or declaratory relief. Rather, the
additional factor of individual damage claims would be interjected into the
class context and would seem to call for 23(b)(3) treatment, including
notice and the privilege of "opting out" of the class.
Consistent with their liberal treatment of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites,
the majority of courts, when faced with the issue, have resolved the matter
in favor of Rule 23(b)(2) treatment. 5 The basis for this classification seems
dictated by the threat that the class device, subjected to the strictures of
the Rule 23(b)(3) notice requirements, would be effectively forestalled as
an instrument for the effectuation of the broad remedial policies of Title
VII.66 It is recognized that the drafters of Rule 23 considered that the Rule
23(b) (2) class action would be applied primarily in the race discrimination
suit. 7 Consequently, back pay relief is considered subsidiary to the pri-
mary thrust of the Title VII class action, which is deemed to be the enjoin-
ing of discriminatory employment practices. 8
However persuasive this argument may appear in the abstract, the
courts which certify such actions under Rule 23(b) (2) are failing to consider
adequately the consequences of such a designation. An individual class
member entitled to pursue back pay upon a finding of defendant's liability
is required to come forward and prove his claim. 9 No notice requirement
attaches to a Rule 23(b) (2) action, so that a class member entitled to back
pay, in the absence of a court's exercise of its discretionary authority to
require notice pursuant to Rule 23(d)(2), 7° would in many circumstances
be precluded because of lack of notice from participating in the fruits of
65. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250-53 (3d Cir. 1975); Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See also Edwards, supra
note 64, at 787. See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1775, at 22-23 (1972).
66. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 253 (3d Cir. 1975).
67. See Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. at 7766 (1970).
68. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 422 (5th Cir. 1974) (back pay
not exclusive or predominant remedy sought); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 8 E.P.D. T
9798, at 6338-39 (N.D. Ga. 1974). See also cases cited note 65 supra.
69. See Edwards, supra note 64, at 797.
70. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(d)(2) provides in part:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders . . . requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise
for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action . . ..
[Vol. 10:325
COMMENTS
his class representative's victory. Further, since the back pay claim is an
individual one, denial of the notice and "opting out" provisions would lock
the individual claimant into a binding judgment adverse to the class."
Not only procedural fairness toward plaintiff class members but a corol-
lary concern for the defendant would also warrant classification under Rule
23(b)(3) of claims for back pay. 72 The defendant should be given the oppor-
tunity to assess prospective back pay claims early in the proceedings so as
to weigh the pros and cons of settlement.7" In addition, a defendant should
not be subjected to relitigation of individual back pay claims, a possibility
which would tend to result from Rule 23(b)(2) classification and its conse-
quent lack of notice to individual class members of the existence of the
suit.74 These arguments have struck a responsive chord in the minds of
several courts. Many courts have dismissed the fine distinctions between
Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and have required notice in all class actions
under the discretionary powers vested in the courts pursuant to Rule
23(d)(2), on the theory that due process requires notification that an indi-
vidual's rights are under determination.7 5
Perhaps the fairest approach to the administration of Title VII class
actions for injunctive relief and back pay is the so-called "bifurcated"
procedure adopted by many of the courts.7 This approach allows the appli-
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
72. See Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (expressing concern
that procedural fairness be accorded losing defendants).
73. See generally Note, The Tentative Settlement Class and Class Action Suits Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 72 MicH. L. REV. 1462 (1974). In any event the Rules
prescribe an early determination of class action maintenance. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
74. See generally Edwards, supra note 64, at 797, citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940). An absent class member deserving of individual relief will not be estopped from
prosecuting his individual claim since the issue of defendant's liability as to him individually
has not been determined. Id.
75. See, e.g., Bormann v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 379 F. Supp. 951, 954
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Lynch
v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Polston v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 7 E.P.D. 9373, at 7662 (W.D. Ky. 1973). See also Airline Stewards & Stewardesses
Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1973) (delineated suit for back
pay as Rule 23(b)(3) action). But see Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250-53
(3d Cir. 1975) (dismissing due process argument on grounds that the Rule 23(b)(2) judgment
binds all class members). See also Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir.
1973) (endorsing trial court's use of discretionary notice in a Rule 23(b)(2) setting); Gilbert
v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267, 273 (E.D. Va. 1973) (court required notice under Rule
23(d)(2)).
76. Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1973); Freeman v. Motor
Convoy, Inc., 8 E.P.D. 9778, at 6339 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D.
695, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Harvey v. International Harvester Co., 56 F.R.D. 47, 48 (N.D. Cal.
1973). See generally Edwards, supra note 64, at 797.
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cation of the full remedial effect of Title VII without sacrificing procedural
fairness toward either the plaintiff class or the defendant. The issue of
defendant's liability for purposes of injunctive relief proceeds under Rule
23(b)(2) with no notice or "opting out" required. If and when defendant's
liability to the class is established a shift to Rule 23(b) (3) treatment occurs
for purposes of litigating individual back pay claims. At this point notice
to the class is mandated, providing the opportunity for individual appli-
cants to appear and have their claims tested.7 7 The flexible bifurcated trial
procedure is currently the best alternative available to those courts which
are not inclined to adopt either the exclusive Rule 23(b)(2) approach 71 or
the more restrictive requirement of notice in all class suits.7 It is felt that
the approaches must ultimately be harmonized by the Supreme Court so
as to inject some uniformity into the Title VII class action picture. 0
IV. CONCLUSION
The disposition of most courts to relax the Rule 23(a) prerequisites and
overlook the real problems of classification under Rule 23(b) is motivated
by worthy considerations of policy. However, it is not the province of the
courts to abandon, either expressly or by implication, the mandates of the
Rules of Procedure legislatively adopted. This diversion has created a good
deal of confusion in the Title VII class action arena. The interests of plain-
tiffs and defendants would best be served by the injection of some uniform-
ity, particularly in the sensitive area of classification under Rule 23(b).
W.R.T.
The bifurcated trial approach still fails to allow the defendant an opportunity to assess
liability early in the proceedings. Further, the procedure fails to accommodate the due process
argument that would require notice and the opportunity to "opt out" of the class to avoid
the binding effect of an unfavorable determination of liability to the class. See cases cited
note 75 supra. Under the majority view, however, which interprets back pay as an additions?
equitable remedy in a cohesive class action, it would be irrelevant whether notice were given
to absent class members prior to litigation of a defendant's liability. See Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250-53 (3d Cir. 1975).
77. At this point, with defendant's liability established, the defendant would arguably
carry the burden of paying the costs of notice. See Meadow v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98,
101-02 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (cost of notice born by defendant where sex discrimination claim
established).
78. See cases cited note 65 supra.
79. See cases cited note 75 supra.
80. See Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 8 E.P.D. 9778 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (calling on
Supreme Court to decide issue, but until resolved, adopting Rule 23(b)(2) approach).
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